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Nietzsche, Truth, and the Horror of Existence 
Philip J. Kain 
Santa Clara University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Some argue that for Nietzsche there are truths and that knowledge of them is both 
possible and desirable.  Others think that Nietzsche rejects the possibility of truth and that 
this gives rise to problems of self-contradiction.  I argue that there is truth for Nietzsche.  The 
truth is that existence is horrible.  Truth exists.  We can know this truth.  But it would likely 
mean our annihilation.  Thus, truth must be avoided—which is different from, despite the fact 
that it will often appear the same as, claiming that truth simply does not exist.  Truth not only 
must be avoided, but we have through long evolution actually learned to avoid it.  We have 
buried it beneath the sediment of millennia.  Truth is possible—at least conceptually 
possible.  We do not have to worry about self-contradiction.  But truth is most difficult to get 
at and thus, fortunately, is unavailable to us.  
 
 
 
 
I 
This article1 will argue that at the center of Nietzsche's vision lies his concept of the "terror and 
horror of existence."2  As he puts it in The Birth of Tragedy:  
 2 
"King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the wise Silenus….When Silenus at last fell 
into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man.  
Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a 
shrill laugh and broke out into these words:  'Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of 
chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for 
you not to hear?  What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach:  not to be born, not to be, to 
be nothing.  But the second best for you is—to die soon.'"3 
 
Why is it best never to have been born?  Because all we can expect as human beings is to suffer.  
Yet, still, this is not precisely the problem.  In a passage most central to this article's interpretation of 
the horror of existence, and a passage found not in Nietzsche's early but in one of his very late 
writings (in Genealogy of Morals, III, §28), Nietzsche tells us that human beings can live with 
suffering, what they cannot live with is meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all.4  In 
Nietzsche's view, we are "surrounded by a fearful void…"5  We live in an empty, meaningless 
cosmos.  We cannot look into reality without being overcome.  Indeed, in Beyond Good and Evil,  
Nietzsche suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it 
completely would perish…"6 
Moreover, it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of 
existence.  He lived it himself.7  In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes:  
Around 1876 my health grew worse….There were extremely painful and obstinate headaches 
which exhausted all my strength.  They increased over long years, to reach a climax at which 
pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred days of pain….My 
specialty was to endure the extremity of pain…with complete lucidity for two or three days in 
succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus.8   
 
The following year, in Nietzsche Contra Wagner, he tells us how significant this suffering was for 
him: 
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I have often asked myself whether I am not much more deeply indebted to the hardest 
years of my life than to any others.…And as to my prolonged illness, do I not owe much 
more to it than I owe to my health?  To it I owe a higher kind of health, a sort of health which 
grows stronger under everything that does not actually kill it!—To it, I owe even my 
philosophy….Only great suffering is the ultimate emancipator of the spirit….Only great 
suffering; that great suffering, under which we seem to be over a fire of greenwood, the 
suffering that takes its time—forces us philosophers to descend into our nethermost depths…9 
 
Nietzsche's belief in the horror of existence is largely, if not completely, overlooked by most 
scholars.10  This article hopes to show that it had a profound effect on his thought, indeed, that his 
thought cannot be adequately understood without seeing the centrality of this concept.  To begin to 
understand its importance, let us consider three different visions of the human condition. 
The first holds that we live in a benign cosmos.  It is as if it were purposively planned for us and 
we for it.  We fit, we belong, we are at home in this cosmos.  We are confirmed and reinforced by it.  
And our natural response is a desire to know it, to contemplate it, and thus to appreciate our fit into it.  
Let us call this the designed cosmos.  Roughly speaking, it is the traditional view held by most 
philosophers from Plato and Aristotle through the medievals.  And for the most part it has 
disappeared in the modern world—few believe in it any more. 
The second vision backs off from the assumptions required by the first.  This view starts with 
Francis Bacon, if not before, and it is the view of most moderns.  Here the cosmos is neither alien nor 
is it designed for us.  It is neither terrifying nor benign.  The cosmos is neutral and, most importantly, 
it is malleable.  What human beings must do is come to understand the cosmos through science and 
control it through technology.  We must make it fit us.  It does not fit us by design.  We must work on 
it, transform it, and mold it into a place where we can be at home.  We must create our own place.  
Thus, for such modern thinkers, we actually end up with more than the ancients and medievals had.  
We end up with a fit like they had, but we get the added satisfaction of bringing it about ourselves, 
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accomplishing it through our own endeavor, individuality, and freedom.  Let us call this the 
perfectible cosmos. 
The third vision takes the cosmos to be alien.  It was not designed for human beings at all, nor 
they for it.  We do not fit.  We do not belong.  And we never will.  The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, 
and we will never surmount this fact.  It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all.  
Best never to have been born.  Let us call this the horrific cosmos.  This is Nietzsche's view. 
Nietzsche simply dismisses the first view, the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore 
anyway.11  On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the second view, that of a perfectible cosmos, very 
seriously.  He resists it with every fiber of his being.12  For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and 
energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress13—the outlook of liberals, socialists, 
even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate.  For Nietzsche, we 
cannot eliminate suffering and to keep hoping we can will simply weaken us.  Instead, we must 
conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it.  And we must develop the strength to 
do so.  We must toughen ourselves.  We need more suffering, not less.  It has "created all 
enhancements of man so far…"14  
If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will 
be overwhelmed—paralyzed.  Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we see that action can 
"not change anything in the eternal nature of things."15  We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound 
illusion…first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates:  the unshakeable faith that 
thought…can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing 
being but even of correcting it.  This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an 
instinct…"16  In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things.  Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it 
to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint."17   
One might think this silly.  After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce 
suffering, improve existence, make progress?  Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility 
of significant change?  Hasn't such change already occurred?   
 5 
We must admit, however, that even if we believe it will be possible to continuously reduce 
suffering, it is very unlikely we will ever eliminate it.  And if that is so, if there will always be some 
suffering, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to adopt Nietzsche's view, to face 
suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it 
weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by our continually hoping to overcome it. 
But whatever we decide about the possibility or impossibility of reducing suffering, the question 
may well become moot: 
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into 
numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented 
knowing.  That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world history," but 
nevertheless, it was only a minute.  After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and 
congealed, and the clever beasts had to die.18 
 
Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we 
think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a short and accidental moment in 
biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness 
of existence.   
Nietzsche, of course, does not reject all forms of change.  After all, he has a theory of will to 
power and of the Übermensch.  What he rejects is the sort of change necessary for a perfectible 
cosmos.  He rejects the notion that science and technology can transform the eternal nature of 
things—he rejects the notion that human effort can end or significantly reduce physical suffering.  
Instead, he only thinks it possible to build up the power necessary to construct meaning in a 
meaningless world and thus to hide the horror of existence.  The horror of existence cannot be 
eliminated.  It can only be concealed. 
We cannot dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to the assumptions of 
Christianity, science, liberalism, socialism, and so forth.  And we certainly cannot dismiss this view if 
 6 
we hope to understand Nietzsche.  At any rate, for Nietzsche, we cannot eliminate suffering, we can 
only seek to mask it. 
 
II 
Let us try to draw out the philosophical implications that follow from the horror of existence.  If 
existence really is horrible, if to know it completely, as Nietzsche suggests in Beyond Good and Evil, 
means we are likely to perish,19 then knowledge of the truth cannot be good for us.  The horror of 
existence, if we think through its consequences, will put us radically at odds with perhaps the most 
fundamental assumption of philosophy since Plato and Aristotle, namely, that the true and the good 
coincide.  Philosophers assume that the truth—far from being harmful—will be good for us.  And 
what is really good for us will necessarily be something that is not an illusion or a lie but the truth.  
As Nietzsche puts it:  "All supreme values are of the first rank, all the supreme concepts…the good, 
the true….neither can these supreme concepts be incommensurate with one another, be incompatible 
with one another…"20  Nietzsche also says, "I seek to understand out of what idiosyncrasy that 
Socratic equation reason = virtue = happiness derives:  that bizarrest of equations and one which has 
in particular all the instincts of the older Hellenes against it."21  For Socrates, the true, the good, and 
happiness coincide. 
So also, in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that the highest happiness is 
activity in accord with the highest excellence, that is, the contemplative activity of the intellect.22  Let 
us grant Aristotle, for the sake of argument, that the life of the intellect is the highest life.  Still, we 
would have to ask why such a life would necessarily make us happy?  There is a hidden assumption 
buried in Aristotle's argument. 
If we were to look back to Sophocles, for example, it would not at all be the case for him that the 
life of the intellect—theoretical wisdom—could be expected to make us happy.  Such wisdom would 
allow us to see more deeply into the truth of things and thus to see what a miserable, terrible, and 
alien cosmos we live in.  We would see into the horror of existence.  Both Sophocles and Nietzsche 
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quote the wisdom of Silenus.  Best never to have been born; second best, die as soon as possible.  All 
we can expect in this world is to suffer.23 
This, obviously, is not Aristotle's view.  In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle tells us, approvingly, 
"that Anaxagoras answered a man who was raising problems…and asking why one should choose 
rather to be born than not by saying 'for the sake of viewing the heavens and the whole order of the 
universe'."24  For Aristotle, "existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved…"25  For Aristotle, 
human beings fit the cosmos, they belong, they are at home.  It is as if the cosmos and human beings 
were designed for each other.  And so at least a part of pursuing the contemplative life would mean 
contemplating one's fit in the cosmos—and this quite plausibly could make one happy. 
For virtue to be compatible with happiness it is necessary that the individual acting virtuously fit 
the world.  We cannot be happy if we continually grate against existence.  So also, if knowing the 
truth about existence is to be compatible with happiness, the truth cannot be that existence is horrible 
and terrifying.  If to be happy, we must avoid knowing the truth, if we must conceal it, if we must lie 
about it, then the true and the good are not compatible.  If the truth is that existence is horrible and 
terrifying, then the life of the intellect cannot produce happiness, and the good for human beings 
cannot be the contemplative life of the intellect.  Truth, goodness, and happiness would not accord. 
But Plato and Aristotle insist they do accord.  If we could free ourselves from our chains, for 
Plato, if we could climb up out of the cave, if we could get used to looking at the sun, we would see 
that the idea of the good is not only compatible with, but is the very source of, the true.26  The last 
thing we would want would be to return to the bottom of the cave.  Contemplating the true and the 
good, for Plato, would be the highest happiness.27  Here, the truth is not horror and terror.  Though, it 
must be said, those still at the bottom of the cave might disagree.  Like Jocasta, they seem to think it 
best not to know.28 
But the view of most, and certainly the view of modern science, is that human rationality can 
discover the truth, that this is good for human beings, and that it will lead to overall progress for 
humanity, that is, to increasing happiness.  As Lange argues in his History of Materialism, which 
 8 
Nietzsche carefully read,29 "Holbach starts from the principle that the truth can never be injurious.  He 
derives this from the wider proposition that theoretical principles…can never be dangerous."30  Lange 
goes on to say that science needs to build up: 
a kingdom of the true, the good, and the beautiful….With the attainment of truth, it results 
from this principle that a fuller and higher humanity is also attained….Here, then, we have, in 
the full sense of the word, a dogma which not only is not proved, but which, in fact, when 
logically tested, is not true, but which, if held as an idea, may, indeed, like any other religious 
idea, edify mankind and raise him above the limits of sense.31 
 
While Lange does not consider the agreement of the true and the good to be a truth, he 
nevertheless considers it to be an edifying idea.  Nietzsche flatly rejects all of this:  "For a philosopher 
to say, 'the good and the beautiful are one,' is infamy; if he goes on to add, 'also the true,' one ought to 
thrash him.  Truth is ugly.…We possess art lest we perish of the truth."32  He also says, "There is no 
preestablished harmony between the furthering of truth and the well-being," that is, the good, "of 
humanity."33 
There is nothing Nietzsche would reject more, we can say, than Plato's allegory of the cave.34  We 
cannot climb up out of the cave and look directly at the truth.  It would probably kill us.  There is a 
reason why we are down in the cave with our backs to the truth.  All that advice that circulates at the 
bottom of the cave, that we should stay there, that it is lunacy to try to get out, is damned good 
advice.  It is true that the shadows at the bottom of the cave are illusions, distortions, lies.  But it is 
not true that the shadows lock us into a prison.  They keep out the horror.  They preserve life.  Life 
exists, only exists, at the bottom of the cave. 
The truth is not good for human beings—the truth is horror.  Reality as it truly is, is not 
beautiful—it is terrifying.  To pursue the truth, far from pursuing the good and achieving happiness, 
as most all philosophers have assumed, would have the consequence of plunging humankind into the 
abyss, of rubbing their noses in the horror of existence.  Life requires lies, illusion, art, veiling.  Life 
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must shun the truth.  Life is not possible with the truth.  To pursue the good, what is best for human 
beings, requires rejection of the true. 
One might try to respond that while it is obviously the case that some things are not good for us, 
nevertheless, knowing the truth is always good for us.  It is certainly best for us to know what is bad, 
dangerous, threatening, and so forth.  It might help us to avoid such things.  But if existence is truly 
alien, if to come to know the truth means we are likely to perish, if it would put an end to human life, 
if existence is ontologically horrible (not just occasionally irritating), then Jocasta is right, knowing 
the truth is not good for us.  Another way to put this is to say that Nietzsche raises the question:  what 
is the value of truth?35  As for Plato, this is to put the good above the true, but for Nietzsche it is not at 
all to value the truth positively.  Nietzsche's answer is that from the perspective of life the true may 
well lack value.  That is the subversive proposition Nietzsche wants to force us to think about. 
Most any philosophy (or science, or religion) wants to do two different things.  It wants in a very 
straightforward way simply to get at the truth.  It has a commitment to, even a deep passion for, the 
truth—Nietzsche calls this will to truth.  It has a drive to weed out the false and discover the true.  At 
the same time, and (it thinks) as a consequence of this commitment to the truth, it seeks meaning and 
purpose, it wants to achieve the good for human beings.  What could be more obvious—even trivial?  
So, on the one hand, we have a desire to get to the real truth—good old honest correspondence with 
reality.  Secondly, we expect this also to give us meaning, purpose, the good. 
Except that all of this is predicated upon a gross error, namely, that the true and the good 
coincide.  If the truth is that existence is horrible, if the true is the furthest thing from the good, then at 
least since Socrates we have been involved in serious contradiction.  In so far as we pursue the real 
truth, insofar as we approach the horror and meaninglessness of existence, we are not headed toward 
meaning, purpose, or the good at all.  We progress toward meaninglessness.  On the other hand, in so 
far as we seek meaning, purpose, and the good, we must mask the true, conceal it, create illusion.  
What emerges from this are two different conceptions of truth, the truth as correspondence to reality 
 10 
and a truth which requires illusion, that is, merely, what we take to be true.  We must recognize that 
Nietzsche has and needs both of these conceptions and that to understand him we must explore both.  
 
III 
Some scholars, like Kaufmann, Wilcox, and Clark, think that for Nietzsche there are truths and 
that knowledge of them is both possible and desirable.36  Other scholars like Danto and Green think 
that Nietzsche rejects the possibility of truth, but they and others also think that this gives rise to 
problems of self-contradiction.37  Nehamas asks whether we are to understand Nietzsche as holding 
his positions to be true:  "If he does, how can this possibly be consistent with his view that all views 
are only interpretations?  If he does not—that is, if he does not think his views are true—why does he 
make the effort to present them in the first place?"38  Others, like Schutte, simply think that Nietzsche 
is inconsistent.  He "does not have a systematic theory of truth; if he did, he would be violating some 
of his major insights on the subject."39 
If one thinks that Nietzsche believes in truth, one will have a natural tendency to gravitate toward 
those passages in Nietzsche's texts that endorse such a view, and there are plenty of such passages to 
be found.  There will also be a natural tendency to want to downplay, subordinate, or interpret away 
those passages where Nietzsche rejects the possibility of truth, and there are plenty of these sorts of 
passages also.  On the other hand, if one does not think that Nietzsche believes that truth is possible, 
one will tend to favor those texts where Nietzsche rejects truth, endorses perspectivism, and claims 
that all is interpretation.  And one will tend to ignore or de-emphasize passages where Nietzsche 
makes truth claims. 
In short, textual support can be found for two different positions here, but each is based on half 
the texts and does not really do justice to the other half.  The position put forth in this article will try 
to do justice to both sets of texts, and do so without holding that Nietzsche is simply unsystematic and 
contradicts himself. 
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The argument will be that there is truth for Nietzsche.  The truth is that existence is horrible and 
terrifying.  Truth exists.  But truth must be avoided—which is different from, despite the fact that it 
will often look the same as, claiming that truth simply does not exist.  Truth not only must be avoided, 
but we have through long evolution actually learned to avoid it.  We have interpreted, simplified, and 
falsified our world so as to make life possible.  We have buried the truth under the sediment of 
millennia.  Truth is possible—at least conceptually possible.  We do not have to worry about self-
contradiction.  But truth is most difficult to get at and thus, fortunately, is unavailable to us.  That, it 
will be argued, is Nietzsche's position.    
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche makes it quite clear that he believes in truth:  "The truth once 
seen, man is aware everywhere of the ghastly absurdity of existence, comprehends the symbolism of 
Ophelia's fate and the wisdom of the wood sprite Silenus:  nausea invades him."40  In the Genealogy 
of Morals, he speaks of a will to truth, "the awe-inspiring catastrophe of two thousand years of 
training in truthfulness that finally forbids itself the lie involved in belief in God.…After Christian 
truthfulness has drawn one inference after another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, 
its inference against itself…"41  In the same text, he also speaks of "plain, harsh, ugly, repellant, 
unchristian, immoral truth.—For such truths do exist.—"42  
Quite clearly, for Nietzsche, truth exists.  What, then, is his response to this horrible truth?  If we 
read carefully, we see that his response, time and again, is that we must avoid this truth.  In The Birth 
of Tragedy, he says:  "The Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence.  That he might 
endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between himself and life the radiant dream-birth of the 
Olympians.…It was in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create these gods…"43  In the 
same text he also says that "Apollonian masks—are the necessary productions of a deep look into the 
horror of nature…"44  In Will to Power, he says, "there is only one world, and this is false, cruel, 
contradictory, seductive, without meaning….We have need of lies in order to conquer this reality, this 
'truth,' that is, in order to live—That lies are necessary in order to live is itself part of the terrifying 
and questionable character of existence."45   
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Thus, truth exists, but we must, we had to, it was necessary to, avoid it.  This 'must,' we should 
notice, is a very deep sort of 'must,' an evolutionary 'must.'  We have learned over millennia and in 
myriad ways to hide the truth.  Most people normally assume that biological as well as cultural 
evolution would tend to improve our ability to get at the truth, that is, that survival would depend on, 
and thus select for, an ability to know the truth.  That, however, only makes sense in a world that fits 
us, where the true and the good coincide.  The evolution of a species for whom existence is horrible 
would be quite different.  Its evolution and development would depend upon an ability to conceal the 
truth.  Truth is not necessary for our preservation, rather: 
In order for a particular species to maintain itself and increase its power, its conception of 
reality must comprehend enough of the calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of 
behavior on it.  The utility of preservation—not some abstract-theoretical need not to be 
deceived—stands as the motive behind the development of the organs of knowledge—they 
develop in such a way that their observations suffice for our preservation.46 
 
As Nietzsche puts it in The Gay Science:  "Innumerable beings who made inferences in a way 
different from ours perished; for all that, their ways might have been truer."47  In the same text, he 
writes: 
Over immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors.  A few of these 
proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species:  those who hit upon or inherited these 
had better luck in their struggle for themselves and their progeny.…it was only very late that 
truth emerged—as the weakest form of knowledge.  It seemed that one was unable to live 
with it:  our organism was prepared for the opposite; all its higher functions…worked with 
those basic errors which had been incorporated since time immemorial.48 
 
In Nietzsche's view, knowing reduces, simplifies, and falsifies the world.  In Will to Power, he 
says:  "The entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and simplification—directed 
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not at knowledge but at taking possession of things…"49  In Beyond Good and Evil, he says that we 
live in "simplification and falsification,"50 and also: 
Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimulus by reproducing once more 
an image that it has produced many times before, instead of registering what is different and 
new in an impression.…we make up the major part of the experience and can scarcely be 
forced not to contemplate some event as its "inventors."  All this means:  basically and from 
time immemorial we are—accustomed to lying.  Or to put it more virtuously and 
hypocritically, in short, more pleasantly:  one is much more of an artist than one knows.51 
 
What clearly begins to emerge here is the second sense in which Nietzsche uses the term 'truth.'  
Besides real truth, the horror of existence, Nietzsche regularly talks about what we take to be true, 
truths we have constructed, truths whose function it is to mask the real truth—that is, illusions.  For 
example, in Will to Power, he says, "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life 
could not live."52  In "On Truth and Lies," he says:  "What then is truth?….Truths are illusions which 
we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained 
of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no 
longer as coins."53  He also says, "life requires illusions, i.e. untruths which are taken to be truths."54  
 
IV 
As has already been said, scholars who think that for Nietzsche truth is both possible and 
desirable tend to downplay those passages where Nietzsche rejects the possibility of truth, and 
scholars who think that Nietzsche rejects the possibility of truth tend to downplay those passages 
where Nietzsche clearly holds that there is knowledge of the truth.  No commentator makes consistent  
sense out of both sets of passages.  The interpretation offered here does so.  Nietzsche makes 
statements that clearly claim that there is truth and he makes statements that clearly claim that there is 
no truth.  How do we reconcile these seemingly contradictory claims?  Truth exists.  The truth is that 
 14 
existence is horrible.  We can know this truth, but it would likely mean our annihilation.  Thus we 
must avoid it.  Moreover, through millennia of evolution we have actually learned to avoid it.  We 
have buried it and replaced it with what we take to be true, that is, with illusions.  And thus all those 
texts which suggest that there is no truth make perfect sense.  There is, in fact, no truth—it has been 
buried.  The claim that there is no truth, here, is not a metaphysical or ontological claim.  It is a social, 
cultural, or historical claim.  We have buried the truth.  We could with great effort dig back through 
millennia of sediment to find it.  Ontologically or metaphysically truth is possible, but socially, 
culturally, and historically it does not exist. 
Nor does Nietzsche have any problem with self-contradiction.  As long as he admits that truth is 
possible, there is no contradiction at all in holding that we have buried it and live in illusion.  There is 
no self-refutation here as there is supposed to be when one says, "nothing is true"—it is usually held 
that if that statement were true, then it would be false.  It is not the case that Nietzsche rejects the 
concept of truth, and thus cannot legitimately employ the concept, such that one could embarrass him 
by asking whether his rejection of truth is to be taken as true.  He accepts the possibility of truth and 
thus can with full legitimacy employ the concept.  The concept is not lost to him.  He just thinks we 
must and have avoided truth, buried it, and created illusions that make life possible. 
Still, a very common objection to Nietzsche runs as follows.  Nietzsche claims that all is 
perspective, interpretation, or illusion.  What then of Nietzsche's own view that all is perspective, 
interpretation, or illusion?  Is it itself also merely a perspective, interpretation, or illusion?  If we 
answer yes, as Nietzsche seems to do at Beyond Good and Evil §22,55 then, as Smith puts it, doesn't 
this leave Nietzsche's view "open to dismissal as merely another groundless perspective"?56 
But how did we all of a sudden arrive at the notion that perspectives, interpretations, and illusions 
are to be dismissed as groundless?  Nietzsche would not agree.  Some perspectives are far more 
valuable than the truth.  If the truth is horror, if we might perish from the truth, then we dismiss 
perspective, interpretation, and illusion at our own risk.  If perspectives are more valuable than the 
truth, if they promote life, if they save us from the truth, they are certainly not to be dismissed.57  
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What must be dismissed is the notion that just because something is a perspective, interpretation, or 
illusion it is not to be taken seriously.  It must be admitted, certainly, that such illusions are not true, 
but, then, their very function is to protect us from the truth.  Thus, it would not seem that Nietzsche 
has any problem in admitting that his views are perspectives, interpretations, or illusions.  
What about when Nietzsche makes such extreme claims as:  "Nothing is true…",58 "there is no 
truth…", or "Everything is false!"59  Are not such claims self-refuting?  Maybe not.  In the first place, 
we have seen that for Nietzsche truth is theoretically possible.  That means there can be some truths.  
Could these statements be among them?  That depends on what these statements are taken to mean.  
They could mean that given millennia of evolution, given the need to avoid the horror of existence, 
the need to create illusions that make life possible, there is in fact no truth left to be found.  Thus, all 
is false, nothing is true.  These claims need not mean that it would be impossible to dig back to the 
truth.  They need not mean that it is impossible to get at the truth.  And thus they need not rule out our 
use of the concept.  They can very well mean merely that truth has systematically been buried.  And 
then perhaps we must just admit that these claims are rhetorically overstated a bit for dramatic effect.  
At any rate, it would seem that this is the way such statements must be read if we are also to take 
seriously other passages where Nietzsche clearly claims that truth is possible. 
But still we have not yet fully come to terms with the issue here.  How much truth can there 
be in the world—can there be any at all—if we are to meaningfully claim that everything is false?  
Indeed, Nietzsche speaks of a will to truth, which is something we find especially in modern 
science, and he thinks that science can get us all the way to the ultimate truth.  It can eventually 
bring us face to face with the horror of existence and plunge us into nihilism.  Moreover, before 
we reach that catastrophe, Nietzsche's view seems to be, science can also get us a good deal of 
ordinary truth.60  How much truth can it give us?  And how is such truth compatible with 
Nietzsche's claim that there is no truth?  
Science can ultimately get us to real truth.  It can get us to the horror of existence and plunge 
us into the void.  But short of this horror, short of ultimate truth, what does science get us?  Does 
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it, for example, continuously accumulate bits of real truth or merely what we take to be truth?  If 
it only gets us the latter, what we take to be truth, that is, illusion, how could it ever through the 
accumulation of such illusions get us to the ultimate truth, the real truth—the horror of existence?  
On the other hand, if we admit that science does regularly accumulate real truth, then there would 
seem to be a lot of real truth floating around.  If science has been accumulating a lot of real truth, 
this would seem to call in question statements like:  "Nothing is true…", "there is no truth…", 
"Everything is false!"  Must we then just accuse Nietzsche of using language too loosely in such 
passages and thus of contradicting his concept of science as an effective will to truth?  Well, 
Nietzsche at least would not seem to think so.  In Beyond Good and Evil, he says that the will to 
ignorance is not the opposite of the will to knowledge, but its refinement.61  We must see that the 
sorts of truths generated by will to knowledge, will to truth, or science, while they may in one 
sense be real truths, are yet in another sense also deceptions, thus merely what we take to be 
truths, that is, illusions.   
We seek the truth, we seek knowledge, we gather up as much scientific understanding as we can, 
we make continuous progress at this, and doing so will for us mask the ultimate horror and 
meaninglessness of the cosmos.  This is to say that the accumulation of scientific truth, real truth, will 
deflect us from, prevent us from seeing, the horror, emptiness, and meaninglessness of existence—the 
ultimate truth.  The scientific amassing of truth thus hides the truth.  Truth conceals the truth—truth, 
don't we have to say it, can lie.  There is a great deal of falsehood—simple and ordinary falsehood—
that derives from the millennia of our avoiding the horror of existence.  But there is even more 
falsehood in that truths—simple and ordinary truths, real truths—can also serve to mask the horror of 
existence, that is, mask the truth.  Our search for truth is really a deep and complex way of hiding the 
truth.  We could even say that rigorous, syllogistic, logical truth, insofar as it absorbs us, insofar as 
we find it impossible to doubt, insofar as we find it meaningful and significant, deflects us from the 
ultimate truth, the horror, emptiness, and meaninglessness of existence—it deceives.  Thus, while we 
can say that, for Nietzsche, a great deal of truth may exist, nevertheless, there is also a falseness about 
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it.  It functions to mask the ultimate truth.  And so Nietzsche has not really contradicted his claim that 
"Nothing is true…", "there is no truth…", "Everything is false!"  It is much like what Nietzsche says 
of Sterne, the author of Tristam Shandy.  The reader who demands to know exactly what Sterne 
"really thinks of a thing, whether he is making a serious or a laughing face, must be given up for lost; 
for [Sterne] knows how to encompass both in a single facial expression; he likewise knows how, and 
even wants to be in the right and in the wrong at the same time…"62 
Still, one might want to object to this, one might want to ask Nietzsche scholars, for example, 
whether they take their own explanations of Nietzsche's views on truth to be accurate, correct—that 
is, true?  And they would no doubt have to admit that they do.  One might then think that this would 
contradict the Nietzschean dictum that 'nothing is true.'  That, however, would be a mistake.  An 
accurate explanation of Nietzsche's views, as much as any other truth, is capable of deflecting us from 
the ultimate truth, the horror of existence, and thus of being a deception. 
Generally speaking, then, truth is horrible and must be avoided.  Nevertheless, as we have seen, it 
is conceptually possible and with great effort we could move toward it.  Indeed, Nietzsche sees this as 
a test of our strength: 
Something might be true while being harmful and dangerous in the highest degree.  Indeed, it 
might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would 
perish, in which case the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of 
the "truth" one could still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would  
require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified.63 
 
Nietzsche also says, "Truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else 
dear to our hearts, on which our love and our trust in life depend, has had to be sacrificed to it.  
Greatness of soul is needed for it…"64  Thus, truth exists, but it is horrible and must be avoided.  
Indeed, for millennia we have been burying it.  It would take great effort to get to it, and the test of 
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our strength is how much of the truth we can bear.  It would be heroic to gain as much truth as we are 
able.65   
Sophocles, too, thought the truth was horrible.  For Jocasta it was something to be shunned.  But 
Oedipus plows ahead and demands the truth.  Truth is terrible, but nevertheless we want it, need it, 
demand it.  To suffer under illusion is demeaning.  To stand in the light of truth is a deep need.  We 
cannot get all the way there, up outside the cave, but we want as much as we can bear.  What then is 
the value of truth?  It is horrible and terrible.  It must be avoided.  Yet it is a test of our strength—our 
greatness.  
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